

The image shows the front cover of a book bound in reddish-brown leather. The cover has a fine, pebbled texture. In each of the four corners, there is an embossed floral or scrollwork design. The text is centered on the cover in a gold or yellow color. The title is in all caps and a serif font, and the year is in a similar font below it.

CHITRAL RELIEF EXPEDITION

1895

VIEWS IN
CHITRAL

*Taken during the Advance of the 3rd Brigade of the Chitral
Relief Force under the Command of*

Brigadier-General W. F. GATACRE, D.S.O.,

BY

Sergeant-Major DEVELIN, R.E.,

1895.

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LIST OF CONTENTS.

	PAGE.		PAGE.
Malakaud Pass	1	Ashreth Valley, North of Ziarat	31
Malakand Pass, from Spur in Valley, during Action ...	2	Do. do. do.	32
Buddist Road, Malakand Pass, looking South	3	Do. do. do.	33
Swat Valley, looking East	4	Do. do. do.	34
Crossing Swat River, looking South	5	Do. shewing Kaffristan Mountains	35
Khamrani Pass, looking North-East	6	View from Ziarat, looking South	36
Laram Pass, looking South	7	Do. do. do.	37
Panjkora River, after Break of Bridge	8	Ziarat Camp, looking North	38
Do. below Swing Raft	9	View North of Ziarat, looking South... ..	39
Do. Scene of "The Guides" Fight	10	Ashreth Valley, looking North-West	40
Do. Suspension Bridge, "The Buffs" Crossing	11	Ziarat Valley, looking South	41
Mamugai at close of Action	12	Ashreth Valley, North of Ziarat	42
A Brass Gun found in Barwa	13	View of Kaffir Rock, shewing Staircase Track	43
Baraul Valley, from Janbatai; Fort Janbatai in distance ...	14	Ashreth Valley, looking South-East	44
View from Janbatai Kotal, looking South-West	15	Do. North of Ziarat, looking South	45
Fort Ido, Baraul Valley	16	Do. near Mirkandi, do.	46
Bandai, Baraul Valley, looking East	17	Badugal Valley, near Mirkandi, looking West	47
Third Brigade Camp at Dir	18	Chitral River, 2 miles North-East of Mirkandi	48
The Khan of Dir, Genl. Gatacre & Staff	19	Do. 3 miles North of Mirkandi	49
Lowari Pass, North of Gujar	20	Aylmer's Staircase, North of Badugal, looking South	50
Gujar, looking North	21	Kila Drosh Forts	51
Valley, South of Lowari Pass, looking West	22	Shishi Kuf Valley, shewing Camps of 3rd Brigade	52
Lowari Pass, looking North, Ghurkas Crossing	23	Khairabad, looking North	53
Do. different View	24	Do. Cliff Bridge, Built by 3rd Brigade, looking North	54
Do. looking South, "The Buffs" Ascending	25	Do. do. do. do.	55
Do. North Side, looking North, "The Buffs" Descending	26	Tiroch Mir, from Chamarkand, 5 miles South of Chitral	56
Do. South Side, "The Buffs" Ascending	27	Do. do. do. do.	57
Do. Ghurkas Descending	28	Do. from Broz	58
Do. "The Buffs" Descending	29	Hill in Broz Valley, where Melhtar Nizam-ul-Mulk was Assassinated	59
The 2nd Batt. 4th Ghurkas at Ziarat	30	View of Chitral Valley from Spalash, looking South	60
		Do. do. South-West of Danin	61

	PAGE.		PAGE.
Chitral Fort, from Left Bank, looking South-West	62	Graves of the Royal Family at Chitral	96
Do. do. do. South	63	Transport Lines, Kila Drosh, looking North	97
Do. do. do. do.	64	Graves of Khans, Gujar Valley	98
Chenar Trees, at North West Tower of Fort	65	Group of No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery	99
Chitral Fort, North-West Corner	66	Gujar Valley in Summer, from Mirga	100
Do. from Top of South-East Tower	67	Divisional Headquarters' Camp, Mirga, from opposite side	
Do. shewing Interior, looking North-West	68	of the Valley	101
Do. Gun Tower, shewing Exploded Mine	69	No. 8 British Field Hospital, Mirga, from East side of	
Do. shewing Mine from Gun Tower	70	Valley	102
Funeral Service over Captain Baird's Grave	71	A Valley on the West side of Mirga Camp	103
Captain Baird's Tombstone	72	Do. do. East do. do.	104
Chitral Bridge, from Left Bank	73	Do. do. North do. do.	105
Do. from Right Bank	74	Do. do. North-West do.	106
Representative Chitralis awaiting Sir Robert Low's arrival	75	Lowari Pass in Summer, from 1 mile North of Gujar,	
at Chitral	75	looking North	107
Representative Chitralis meeting Sir Robert Low	76	Brigade Headquarters' Camp, from Divisional Headquarters'	
Inspection by General Sir Robert Low at Chitral	77	Camp	108
Do. do. do.	78	No. 3 Field Post Office, Third Brigade	109
Do. do. do.	79	"The Buffs'" Camp at Mirga, from East side of Valley	110
Sir George Robertson, K.C.S.I.; Capt. Townshend, C.I.H.;		Arnawei Valley, 4 miles West of Zakhanah Pass	111
Lieut. Gurdon, Asst. Political; Lieut. Harley, 14th		Group of Reconnaissance Party, Arnawei Valley	112
Sikhs	80	Camps of Amir of Afghanistan's Troops, Arnawei Valley	113
Provisional Melhtar and Ministers	81	Bridge over Swat River, built by Capt. Williams, R.E.	114
Amir-ul-Mulk and Guard, Chitral	82	Pontoon Bridge over Swat River, September, 1895	115
Colonel Kelly and Officers, 32nd Pioneers	83	Do. do. do.	116
Divisional Headquarters' Staff, C. R. Force	84	Cemetery on the Laram Pass	117
Sir Robert Low's Escort—Seaforth Highlanders	85	Do. do.	118
Third Brigade Staff, Chitral	86	Suspension Bridge, between Warai and Darora, in Panjkora	
Officers of "The Buffs," Chitral	87	River	119
"The Buffs" at Chitral	88	Darora Camp, Panjkora Valley	120
Lowari Pass in Summer, looking North	89	View of Panjkora River, near Darora	121
Gujar, looking South	90	A View in Panjkora Valley	122
Do. do.	91	The Khan of Dir, September, 1895	123
Shuja-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, witnessing game of Polo	92	Do. do. and Minister	124
Do. in the Fort	93	Bridge over Panjkora River at Chotiayan	125
Shuja-ul-Mulk, Mehtar of Chitral, with Attendants	94	Do. do. do.	126
No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery—"Action Front"	95	"The Buffs'" Encampment, Laram Pass, August, 1895	127

THE STORY OF THE CAMPAIGN.

IN February, 1895, Umra Khan crossed the Lowari Pass *en route* to Kila Drosh, which lay in the Chitral country. Chitral was an Independent State, ruled by a Mehtar under the supervision of the British Agent at Gilgit, which post was at the time held by Surgeon-Major Robertson, Indian Medical Service, an Officer of long experience in the Political Department.

It happened that in the preceding year, on the death of the old Mehtar, there had been a struggle between his two sons, Nizam and Amir-ul-Mulk, as to which should succeed him. Nizam, as the elder, had been recognised and established by the British Government, but was, nevertheless, justly suspicious of his brother's designs. He had on more than one occasion applied to Captain Younghusband, Assistant Political Officer, and resident in Chitral, for leave to murder his rival, saying that unless he did so he felt sure that he himself would fall a victim to treachery. This was exactly what took place, for on January 1st, 1895, Amir-ul-Mulk invited Nizam to a hawking party near Broz, some ten miles South of Chitral, and there shot him dead.

The murderer at once sought the recognition of the British Government from Mr. Gurdon, who had succeeded Captain Younghusband as Political Officer, and who, with an escort of eight Sepoys, was the only Englishman in Chitral at the time. But it was impossible for Gurdon to take responsibility with regard to a new ruler without reference to higher authority; he therefore applied for instructions from Gilgit. Amir-ul-Mulk in the meantime applied to his relative, Umra Khan for assistance against the English. The latter, an able and unscrupulous marauder, who had conquered and annexed all the countries contiguous to his own, and was in consequence much feared and disliked by his neighbours, marched willingly on this invitation from his ancestral home at Barwa, in the Jaudol Valley, delighted at the prospect of fighting a new foe.

On his arrival at Kila Drosh, finding the fort held against him, he proceeded to build another in close proximity, and to invest the old fort with its Chitrali Garrison. After a few days' fighting, the old fort was treacherously surrendered by the Governor.

When the news of this invasion reached Dr. Robertson at Gilgit, he sent a message to Umra Khan, ordering him to quit Kila Drosh, and warning him that in the event of a refusal active measures would be taken against him. At the same time the Government of India was informed of these disturbances, and of the further report that Sher Afzal, a turbulent member of the Chitral Royal line, had given his support to Umra Khan, and was mustering men in his cause.

On February 3rd the following proclamation was issued by the Viceroy:—

"Be it known to you, and any other persons concerned, that Umra Khan, Chief of Jaudol, in spite of repeated assurances of friendship to the British Government, and regardless of frequent warnings to refrain from interfering with the affairs of Chitral, which is a protected State, under the suzerainty of Kashmir, has forcibly entered the Chitral Valley, and has attacked the Chitrali people. The Government of India have now given Umra Khan full warning that unless he retires from Chitral by the 1st April, corresponding with the 1st day of Showar 1312 H., they will use force to compel him to do so. In order to carry out this purpose they have arranged to assemble on the Peshawar border a force of sufficient strength to overcome all resistance, and to march through Umra Khan's territory towards Chitral. The sole object of the Government of India is to put an end to the present, and to prevent any future, unlawful aggression in Chitral territory; and as soon as this object is attained the force will be withdrawn. The Government of India have no intention of permanently occupying any territory through which Umra Khan's misconduct may now force them to pass, or of interfering with the independence of the tribesmen so long as they, on their part, refrain from attacking or impeding in any way the march of the troops. Supplies and transport will be paid for. and all persons are at liberty to pursue their ordinary avocations in perfect security."

But some time before this threat appeared, on the 12th January Dr. Robertson had started from Gilgit with about 400 men for Chitral, which he reached on January 31st. On his arrival Dr. Robertson took possession of the fort, made a

political prisoner of Amir-ul-Mulk, and established Shuja-ul-Mulk, a younger brother of about 13 years, as Mehtar. The insurgent Chitralis then rallied under Sher Afzal, and on March 3rd the siege began.

The fort was a square building, enclosed by four walls of mud, stones and timber, each side being about 80 yards long; at each corner there was a tower about half as high again as the walls, and on the side adjacent to the river there was a covered way which was protected by a fifth tower, the Water Tower.

On March 1st there were about 543 men inside the fort; this included 99 Rifles of 301 of the 4th Kashmir Rifles Imperial Service Troops. The officers of the garrison were Captain Campbell, Central India Horse, who was severely wounded in the knee on March 3rd; he was succeeded in the command by Captain Townshend, also of the Central India Horse; Captain Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry, killed March 3rd, Lieutenant Gurdon, Assistant Political Officer, Lieutenant Harley, 14th Sikhs, and Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch.

On March 3rd a reconnaissance was ordered out by Captain Campbell with the object of discovering the position of Sher Afzal, who was said to be approaching with a large force. The story of the fight that followed is best told in Captain Townshend's own words:—

"*Reconnaissance, 3rd March, 1895.*—About 4.30 p.m., the news of the approach of Sher Afzal and a force was brought in, and I was ordered to take out 200 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles by Captain Campbell, Central India Horse.

I threw out an advanced guard of one section under Subadar Badri Nar Singh and sent Captain Baird with them, and advanced in extended order. Captain Campbell ordered me to leave 50 men at the Serai, and so I left Subadar Harichand and 50 rifles at this place. Captain Campbell sent me orders to block the Ayun-Chitral road, and accordingly I occupied the eastern spur of the face on which the Political Officer's house stands, and which commands the road with a clear field of fire to the front up to over 1,000 yards; on reaching this spur I found that Captain Baird had been sent up on the high ground to the eastward among the trees, and had taken the section with him, and Captain Campbell soon ordered me to send another 25 men to Baird. This I did, sending Jemadar Shamu in command of it. After about half-an-hour Captain Campbell ordered me to advance on a house in which he said they had received news that Sher Afzal was to be found. He indicated the house on the plain, about a mile and a half to the south. I accordingly advanced in extended order, half company in firing line and half company in support. On reaching this house we found it empty, but I saw a hamlet about 500 yards further on, and I could see a lot of men moving about there among the trees and houses. I continued the advance. I

could see our men (Baird's party) dotted up on the hill-side on the northern slopes of a nullah, and some men on the opposite (southern) side of the nullah, evidently Chitralis. Very soon I heard shots on these hill slopes, so concluded the men I could see in my front moving about in the village were the enemy, and I opened fire with a section volley. This fire was immediately returned by the enemy. I now advanced in the ordinary way, getting the men under cover as much as possible, and giving them steady volleys until I got within 200 yards or so. The enemy now made most excellent shooting—the Martini and Snider—and men began to get hit, although I had got the men under a stone-reveted bank. I could see that the hamlet or village was full of men. I could see men in white clothes and standards, and they kept up a well-sustained fire from the walls and loop-holes and there was no more cover to my front.

I determined to hold on to this ground I had reached with my 100 men until Baird should move along the hill slopes to the westward and so turn the village, and I could then rush it. However, time went on and I could see no signs of Baird, and small parties of the enemy of four and five began to overlap my left flank towards the river, and were enfilading us with their fire, and in a similar way they began to move forward on my right. It was now 6.30 p.m., and it would soon be dark. Captain Campbell shortly after this arrived and said that the village must be rushed. I gave the order 'to reinforce,' but the support of men in rear did not come up. I kept on repeating the order, but no one came. Captain Campbell then went back to fetch the men himself, while I fixed bayonets preparatory to the charge, and kept up a heavy independent fire. The support was among some low walls 150 yards to the rear. Campbell managed to bring about a dozen men, and fell shot through the knee as he rejoined me. I then sent Colonel Jagat Singh, who only got one or two men. It was no good waiting any more, so I went round among the men, telling them that we must take the houses, rushing straight in, and I sounded the charge. We were met by a most close and destructive fire as we scrambled over the bank and rushed on. General Baj Singh was shot dead on one side of me and Major Bhikam Singh, of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, mortally wounded on the other side. After about 30 and 40 yards the men began to take cover, laying down behind stones, and the charge could not be carried home, though I tried all I could to get the men on.

Seeing that it was hopeless, that it was impossible to carry the village, I ordered the men to retire, and the men collected again under the bank whence we had charged from. It was getting rapidly dark and the enemy were overlapping us fast. I ordered a retirement, for I saw it would not do to be caught among the stone walls and hamlets between us and Chitral Fort in the dark. I told off some men to carry off Captain Campbell and Major Bhikam Singh, and sent them off. I then retired my party by alternate parties, keeping

up a heavy fire whilst the men dribbled off to the rear in twos and threes by word of command, remaining with the last party myself. The enemy's fire being too close to carry out the retirement in any other manner, I carried out the retirement in alternate parties in this way, the enemy following us up very closely and getting round our flanks. I rallied the men for a stand at a small house with a half-walled enclosure, where I found the British Agent rallying the men. The British Agent then went to bring out the company of 14th Sikhs to support us. I begged him to get on his horse and told him that I would manage to get my party in all right; the enemy were now all round us and their swordsmen were getting bold. The British Agent was fired at on all sides as he rode across the polo-ground. I commenced the retirement again, the men now having very little ammunition left.

We were now fired into on all sides, front, flank and rear, from every hamlet and wall, and it was now quite dark and impossible at a short distance to, distinguish friend from foe. Captain Campbell, who had been put on a pony notwithstanding that he was severely wounded, helped me in keeping the men together. Crossing the polo-ground the enemy kept up a fire on us from the houses and the orchards. On reaching the serai I found 50 men of the 14th Sikhs under Lieutenant Harley, who had come out to cover our retreat. I directed him to cover our retirement into the fort, and, restoring order among the 4th Kashmir Rifles, retired into the fort; the Sikhs covered the retreat very steadily. I took command now at the fort, as Campbell was severely wounded. Every man was sent to his station. I heard that Captain Baird had been desperately wounded away on our right flank, and that he and Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch had not come into the fort. He had been wounded in the early part of the action. About 8 p.m. Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch came in, bringing Captain Baird, who was mortally wounded. Thirteen of the 4th Kashmir Rifles had stuck by them—Gurkhas and one or two Dogras, under Subadar Badri Nar Singh. They had had a marvellous escape. They had to charge one or two walls or sangars where the enemy tried to stop them; several of the party were killed, Baird receiving another wound as he was being carried; they had to rush one sangar with the bayonets.

Casualties.

Killed.—British officer:—Captain Baird, 24th Punjab Infantry.

General Baj Singh, Imperial Service Troops.

Major Bhikam Singh, 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Hospital-Assistant Bhawani Dass, and 21 non-commissioned officers and sepoy, 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Wounded.—British officer:—Captain Campbell, Central India Horse; Jemadar

Rab-Nawáz Khan, 15th Bengal Cavalry, and 28 non-commissioned officers and sepoy of the 4th Kashmir Rifles.

Total twenty-three killed and thirty-three wounded=56 killed and wounded out of 200 men, and 150 only actually engaged.

I recalled the picquet of 20 men at the bridge head at night, about half a mile off, and the Havildar managed to bring in the party without being attacked.

Number of rounds expended in action on this day=15,935 rounds Snider. The men carried mostly 120 rounds a man in the pouches; much ammunition was lost by the men lying down with open pouches and cartridges would fall out on the ground. I ordered expense ammunition to be carried in a haversack by the men after this, so as to ensure easy feeding, and that cartridges would not be lost.

I should have mentioned that Lieutenant Gurdon accompanied the British Agent on this day, and was sent off to join Baird's party on the right."

From that day the besieged were completely cut off from all communications with the outside world, and did not again leave the fort till the sortie of April 7th, for an account of which see a further extract from the same dispatch.

17th April, 1895. *Wednesday.*—Jemadar Rab Nawáz Khan, of the 15th Bengal Cavalry, warned us that he thought the tom-toms and band at the summer-house might possibly be to drown the noise of their making a mine. I warned the sentries in the gun-tower to be on the alert and to listen intently; also the sentries in the tambour at the main gate. At midnight on the 16th one of the sentries in the lower story of the gun-tower reported the noise of knocking. I went up and listened for some time but could hear nothing.

About 11 A.M. on the morning of the 17th the native officer in the gun-tower reported to me he could hear the noise of knocking. I went up into the tower in the lower story, and there was no doubt that a mine was being made, and it had reached within twelve feet of the foot of the tower. The British Agent came up, and we both agreed that there was only one thing to do, and that was the summer-house must be rushed, and that soon, and the mine destroyed.

There was no time to countermine. I told off Lieutenant Harley and 40 men of the 14th Sikhs and Major Bhagwán Singh, Subadar Gandib Singh and 60 men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles, and decided to let the party out of the garden-gate at 4 P.M. in the afternoon. They would only have to go fifty yards, and the enemy in all probability would be surprised, and 100 men would be ample to do the business. Men were told off to carry the powder-bags, powder-hose, matches and picks to destroy the mine. The shafts in all probability would be in the summer-house.

I gave the following instructions to Lieutenant Harley:—No firing, bayonet only; 40 rounds in pouch; take a prisoner or two if possible; take three powder-bags; 110 lbs. of powder, 40 feet powder-hose, picks and spades. To go straight for the gap in the wall of house; no dividing up the party; no support. Having rushed the place to hold the house on front towards Fateh Ali Shah's house, and with the remaining men destroy the mine by pulling down the uprights and wooden supports, if any, or blow it in as he saw fit. No hurry. If the sangar in front of the garden-gate annoyed, he should send some men round it, first sounding the "Cease Fire" and let us know what he was going to do, and we would cease firing from the parapets on the sangar in question.

I had up all the officers going with him and explained the object of the sortie that they might explain it thoroughly to their non-commissioned officers and men, so that every man going should know the object of the sortie, as the stupidest man in the detachment might then be the means of carrying it out successfully.

All officers carried matches, and one officer was told off to bring up the rear and see no man hung back.

The gate was opened, and the party rushed out, a few hurried shots and they were into the house, and had captured it, two men of the 4th Kashmir Rifles being shot dead as they got in. About 30 Pathans were in the house and they bolted down the garden wall, but stopped at the far end of the garden and kept up a heavy fire into the house and sustained it throughout, Harley's men keeping up a heavy fire in return. The mine shaft was found just outside the house behind the garden wall, and 35 Chitralis were bayoneted in the mouth of the mine as they came out, all being armed with swords. Two Pathans were shot in the house; two prisoners were taken. In the meanwhile we had gone to our stations on the parapet and kept up a lively fire from the parapet; several of the enemy were killed running away across the open towards the bazaar. It was several times reported to me from the towers that a considerable number of the enemy were making their way down to the river bank from Fateh Ali Shah's house and coming round behind the garden wall, round towards our waterway; and they lined the garden wall at the east end of the garden, and opened fire on us with rifles. Two Gurkhas of the 4th Kashmir Regiment were shot dead in the garden, as they crept along the wall answering this fire. A considerable number of the enemy were seen gathering along the river bank, and this made me anxious of a counter-attack on our waterway, so I occupied the stables with 20 men, withdrew the Sikhs from the west parapet and put them in the north-east angle of the fort, to support and flank the waterway. I sent three different messages to Lieutenant Harley to hurry up in his work at destroying the mine, and warning him of the enemy gathering at the end of the garden. Soon after 5 p.m. I heard the explosion of powder, and the

party came rushing back into the garden-gate, the enemy from the end of the garden keeping up a furious fusillade on them. The party lost eight killed and 13 wounded, viz., three Sikhs killed and five wounded, and five of the 4th Kashmir Regiment killed and eight wounded; total 21 killed and wounded out of 100 men.

The effect of the powder-bag was excellent, although it exploded before they were ready and it was untamped. The whole mine was burst open right up to the foot of the gun-tower and lay exposed like a trench. Two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the powder. We computed the loss of the enemy at about sixty men, taking into consideration the men shot from the parapets of the fort. The north and the flag towers accounted for eight of the enemy. The two prisoners were brought in. Harley and his party had done their work well.

The following men are to be recommended for the Order of Merit for bravery in the affair:

- o No. 772, Naick Garja Singh, 14th Sikhs.
- No. 926, Havildar Santok Singh, 14th Sikhs.
- No. 1822, Sepoy Attar Singh, ..
- No. 1508, „ Karram Singh, ..
- † No. 578, „ Nikoo, 4th Kashmir Rifles.

The party round the mine were under fire from the end of the garden wall at 150 yards range.

Number of rounds expended—2,795 on this day (1,560 Martini-Henry and 1,435 Snider).

We started a couple of countermines this evening under the gun-tower, so that if the enemy mined again they must break into our gallery.

18th April, Thursday.—Enemy very quiet to-day. Working hard at our countermines, gangs relieving all day and working in three hours' reliefs.

The prisoners gave information that the enemy had intended to make another and determined attempt to fire the water-tower, but waited to see the effects of their mine either by burning or by gunpowder. They had intended to blow up the tower to-morrow night. That no other mines were in contemplation. That some of our troops had arrived at Mastuj, and had attacked Mahomed Isa who was in position at Nasr Gol, this side of Mastuj, but had had the worst at the

* Jumped into the mine shaft first with Lieutenant Harley, and bayoneted the first Chitrali, being wounded in the hand with a talwar cut.

† Sepoy Nikoo, 4th Kashmir Rifles, also jumped into the mine shaft at the same time.

skirmish, and had retired again to Mastuj. That Sher Afzal had sent to Umra Khan, asking him to assist him with 2,000 men.

19th April.—About 3 A.M. this morning Lieutenant Gurdon, who was on middle watch, reported that a man was outside calling out under the fort wall that he had important news to tell. All precautions were taken; he was admitted to the main gate, and he told us of the flight of Sher Afzal and the Jandol Chief about midnight, and of the near approach of Colonel Kelly's column from Mastuj. All the sangars were deserted. In the morning not a man was to be seen about Chitral. The siege, which had lasted 46 days, was at an end. A letter was received from Colonel Kelly this night, with news of his fighting on the road and of the Peshawar force advancing also. The Gilgit column accordingly arrived at 2 P.M. on the 20th, the 32nd Pioneers looking in very good trim and good condition.

Our losses † throughout the siege, including the 3rd of March, amounted 104 killed and wounded of all ranks, out of 370 combatants forming the British Agent's escort.

C. V. F. TOWNSHEND, *Captain,*
Central India Horse.

26th April, 1895.

The Siege had lasted 46 days; in the meantime two forces were directing their march on Chitral; but, owing to the vigilance of the besiegers, the garrison were unable to send any message to their friends at Gilgit, so that although the siege began, as has been said, on 3rd March, it was not till the 22nd of the same month that Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly received orders to start for Chitral. This was done in the afternoon of the same day, the force being composed of 396 men of the 32nd Pioneers, two Guns of the Kashmir Mountain Battery, some Kashmir Sappers and Miners and a small body of local levies. Colonel Kelly's dispatch gives a most graphic account of the difficulties that he encountered; this march of 220 miles was accomplished in 29 days, an exploit of which all Englishmen must be proud.

No. 1-C, dated Chitral, the 6th May, 1895.

From—LIEUTENANT-COLONEL KELLY, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following report of the operations of the Gilgit Force in the relief of Chitral, from the 23rd March to the 23rd April, 1895.

† All the gunshot wounds caused by Martini and Snider bullets except two.—C. V. F. T.

2. About the 9th February I received orders from the Resident in Kashmir to hold half the 32nd Pioneers in readiness to move to Gilgit but not to do so till I received his or Surgeon-Major Robertson's orders. I therefore selected 400 men to carry 20 lbs. kits and to move with the 100 mules forming the regimental transport in the Indus valley.

3. *Indus Valley, Gilgit, 14th to 22nd March.*—On the night of the 14th March I was directed by the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, to move my men up to Gilgit, which I accordingly did from Buner and Jullipur, arriving there on the 20th and 22nd.

4. *Disposition of troops remaining in Gilgit.*—In accordance with your telegram No. 592-F-C, I assumed command of the Gilgit Force and marched out with 200 Pioneers, and directed the other half to escort next day the two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, which I had suggested should be brought in from Nomal to Gilgit, and also called up 200 more Pioneers from Buner to Gilgit, and directed the remainder of the 32nd Pioneers to discontinue work on the road and proceed to Chilas Fort, releasing 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts along the Indus valley in strength at Bunji and Ramghat bridge.

5. *Gupis-Ghizr, 23rd to 31st March, 1895.*—The two detachments arrived at Gupis on the 26th and 27th March, where the mule transport was changed to coolie and local pony carriage, to enable the Government transport to work in the conveyance of stores between Gilgit and Gupis. An opportunity was taken here to further reduce the stores required to be carried, by dropping our Pioneer equipment, &c. The march was resumed again on the 27th and 28th March, and Ghizr was reached by the two columns on the 30th and 31st March respectively, snow lying on the ground to the depth of a foot.

6. *Supplies.*—The unfortunate absence of Captain Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary General in Mastuj, was a source of some anxiety as to the supplies available for the column, as I wished to be independent of the stocks that might be available in the places we were attempting to relieve. At Gupis we could not ascertain what supplies had been sent forward, and the balances there were insufficient to take more than was necessary for the road, although they were near the base at Gilgit for replenishing their stock. At Ghizr I found there was sufficient for 1,000 men for 11½ days, and probably supplies in Mastuj for the garrison there for 16 days. I was able after passing Laspur to somewhat supplement our resources locally.

7. *Transport.*—The collection of transport at Ghizr was a matter of some difficulty, and on the 1st April, before marching, it was found that many of the Yassin coolies had absconded, which meant that a further reduction would have

to be made in the supplies to be carried. An attempt was made to bring them back, but only a few returned, and I eventually found that I had only six days' supplies to carry us on to Mastuj, but I hoped to obtain some on the road there.

8. *Shandur Pass, 1st April*—On the 1st April I marched out with the entire column, as per margin, with some 500 coolies and ponies for transport; but after proceeding about eight miles I found it was impossible for the mules of the battery and the pony transport to make their way through the snow over the unbeaten track, as they sank up to their girths. I therefore determined to return, and on arrival at village Teru. I directed 200 of the 32nd Pioneers, 40 Kashmir Sappers and Miners, and 50 Hunza Levies to remain there under Captain Borradaile, and directed him to make an attempt to cross the pass next day, and on arrival at Laspur to entrench himself there, return the coolie transport, and endeavour to open communication with Mastuj. The manner in which he carried out these instructions are fully given in his report, herewith attached and marked D.

9. *Shandur Pass, 2nd and 3rd April*—To enable him to proceed I left all the coolie carriages at Teru, and after transferring all kits and excess stores to the pony transport, I took the remainder back to Ghizr, where they could be more easily fed, and I could replenish myself with stores there, as the Hakim was beginning to bring in wheat. Snow began to fall in the evening and continued through the night and the greater part of the following day, 2nd April, preventing Captain Borradaile's departure. I permitted trials being made for the transport of the guns on sledges, and for that purpose they were sent out to Teru on the 3rd April, and eventually accompanied Captain Borradaile's party, who were able to make a start on that day.

10. *Shandur Pass, 5th to 9th April*—Having assured myself of the state of commissariat supplies, I started with my staff officer, Lieutenant Beynon, and 50 Nagar Levies on the 5th April, and reached Laspur on the 6th. The second party under Lieutenant Peterson were not able to leave till the 8th April and reached Laspur on the 9th April.

The crossing of the Shandur Pass was an arduous undertaking, and at the most unseasonable time of the year, but I am proud to say that the trials were most cheerfully borne. Unfortunately for us recent falls had made the snow some three to four feet deep, and obliterated any track that may have existed. We could hardly expect to cross without some cases of snow-blindness and frost-bite, and of these in the whole column the total cases were 63 of the former and 43 of the latter; only the cases of frost-bite were severe.

11. *Laspur, 6th and 7th April*—On the afternoon of his arrival, Captain Borradaile, hearing of the enemy in the neighbourhood, reconnoitred about two miles in the Mastuj direction, and on the following day, 6th April, advanced as far as Gasht with his reconnaissance. The Levies going in advance discovered that the enemy had constructed sangars on our line of advance at Chakalwat. On the recommendation of the medical officer, to allow of the cases of snow-blindness recovering, a halt was made on the 7th April. Raja Akhbar Khan and 50 Levies arrived in camp on this day.

12. *Gasht, 8th April*—Considering that any delay would permit of a greater concourse of the enemy at Chakalwat (Derband on the map) I determined not to wait for the second detachment of the 32nd Pioneers, under Lieutenant Peterson, and to proceed next day, 8th April, to Gasht, which I accordingly did with a force, strength as per margin, the guns being carried by coolies. On arrival I proceeded to some high ground beyond the village of Gasht, and could distinctly see the enemy sitting in their sangars on the left bank of the river, and men creeping up the steep Shalaf hill on the right bank to positions above their stone shoots.

Lieutenant Beynon, with a few picked Hunza levies, ascended the high hills almost behind the right rear of the enemy's position, and brought back an extremely good sketch of the whole of the position, a copy of which is attached to the report. I immediately sent back for Raja Akhbar Khan and his 50 levies, who joined us during the night.

13. *Action of Chakalwat, 9th April*—On the morning of the 9th April I advanced to the attack of the enemy. In the early morning Lieutenant Beynon, with the Hunza levies, ascended the high hills on the left bank of the river, to turn the right of the position and attack in rear. The Punyal levies were sent up the hills on the right bank to turn out the men above the stone shoots.

I advanced in the following manner:—

Half company, 32nd Pioneers—advanced guard.	} Main body.
Kashmir Sappers and Miners.	
Half company, 32nd Pioneers.	
Two guns, 1st Kashmir Mountain Battery, carried by coolies.	
One company, 32nd Pioneers.	

The baggage, under escort of the rear guard, remained in Gasht till ordered forward after the action.

An advance was made to the river where the bridge had been broken, but sufficiently repaired by the Sappers and Miners for the passage of the infantry, the guns forded the river, and the force ascended to the fan facing the right sangar of the enemy's position.

13. *Orders for Attack*.—My instructions for the attack were that the advanced guard were to leave the road and form up on the highest part of the fan facing "A" Sangar, which was to be silenced by volley firing and the guns; the same course to be afterwards adopted on "B" Sangar, when an opportunity would probably offer itself for the infantry to descend to the river bed and ascend to the left bank to enfilade the enemy in the remaining sangars, which would, no doubt, be vacated on the appearance of the levies under Lieutenant Beynon in their rear.

14. *Configuration of ground*.—The configuration of the ground was as follows:—The road from the river after leaving Gasht brought us on to an alluvial fan, the ascent to which was short and steep; it was covered with boulders and intersected with nullahs; the road led across this fan and then along the foot of steep shale slopes and shoots within 500 yards of the line of sangars crowning the opposite side of the river bank, and totally devoid of any sort or description of cover for some two miles; it could also be swept by avalanches of stones set in motion by a few men placed on the heights above for that purpose.

15. *Enemy's position*.—The enemy's position consisted of a line of sangars blocking the roads from the river up to the alluvial fan on which they were placed. The right of the position was protected by a snow glacier which descended into the river bed, and furthermore by sangars which extended into the snow line up the spur of the hills.

16. *Course of the action*.—The course of the action was as follows:—

The advanced guard formed up at about 800 yards from the position, and the main body in rear.

The 32nd Pioneers then advanced to the attack—

One Section, "C" Company extended (left of line).
 One Section, "C" Company extended in support.
 Two Sections, "C" Company }
 "A" Company } in reserve.

The guns now took up position on the right, and opened on "A" Sangar at a range of 825 yards.

As the action progressed, the supporting section of "C" Company advanced and reinforced. The remaining half of "C" Company advanced, and, leaving sufficient space for the guns, took up their position in the firing line on the extreme right.

Volley firing at first was opened at 800 yards, but the firing line advanced 150 to 200 yards as the action progressed. At a later stage one section of "A" Company was pushed up to fill a gap on the right of the guns in action in the centre of the line.

The enemy, after receiving some well-directed volleys and correctly-placed shells, were seen to vacate "A" Sangar by twos and threes, until it was finally emptied.

17. *Flank Attack*.—During our advance to the fan, shots were heard in the direction of the hills, Lieutenant Beynon having come into contact with the enemy in their sangars up the hillside, who were driven from ridge to ridge.

18. *Flight of enemy*.—When "A" Sangar was vacated, attention was directed on "B" Sangar, and the same course adopted with the same result; at the same time those driven down from the hills above streamed into the plain and there was then a general flight. Six shrapnel were fired into the flying enemy at ranges of 1,000, 1,200, and 1,350 yards (three rounds per gun).

19. *Capture of enemy's position*.—A general advance was then made down precipitous banks to the bed of the river, covered by the fire of the reserves, the river forded, and Sangars "A" and "B" occupied. The guns were then carried across, and the whole line of sangars having been vacated, the column was re-formed on the fan; the time taken in crossing enabled the enemy to get well on their way to Mastuj; the advance was then continued to a village a mile and a half further along the bed of the river, where a halt was made.

20. *General details*.—The casualties consisted of one man of the 32nd Pioneers severely wounded, and three Kashmir Sappers slightly.

The action commenced at 10.30 a.m., and lasted one hour. The position was of unusual natural strength, and the disposition of the sangars showed considerable tactical ability, being placed on the edge of high cliffs on the left bank of the river.

The enemy were computed at 400 to 500, and were armed with Martini-Henry and Snider rifles; several dead were found in the sangars, and the losses I estimate to have been from fifty to sixty.

The whole action was carried out with the extreme steadiness of an ordinary morning parade, the volleys being well delivered and controlled.

21. *Advance on Mastuj*.—After a halt we continued our advance by the left bank till within three miles of Mastuj, where the river was forded and the garrison of Mastuj was seen drawn up on the crest of the fan.

During the day-time the garrison had noticed the enemy gradually vacating their positions; some were said to have heard our volleys and guns. By evening the enemy had all gone towards Chitral, and the garrison were able to turn out after an investment of eighteen days.

The column arrived in Mastuj at about 5 P.M., and the baggage guard by 8 P.M.

22. *Mastuj, 10th to 12th April*.—From the 10th to 12th a halt was made in Mastuj, to allow of arrangements for supplies and transport for our own onward progress; the guns were mounted on local ponies, and the second detachment of the 32nd Pioneers arrived on the 11th April, accompanied by Surgeon-Captain Luard, Indian Medical Service, with the base hospital which was established at Mastuj.

On the 10th April I ordered Captain Bretherton, Deputy Assistant Commissary-General, to return to Ghizr and carry out the duties of his office between Gilgit and that place.

Opportunity was taken during this period to repair the bridge over the Yarkhun river, one mile below Mastuj, and on the 11th April a reconnaissance was made by the levies, who reported that the enemy were preparing a strong position on the Nisa Gol.

23. *Reconnaissance of Nisa Gol*.—On the 12th April a further reconnaissance was made with the levies under Lieutenant Beynon, the enemy perceiving his actions.

An excellent sketch of their position was the result, and clearly guided me in my course of action, and ladders were also made to use in crossing the main nullah where practicable.

24. *Description of enemy's position at Nisa Gol*.—The position of Nisa Gol was a practically strong one and considered by the Chitralis to be impregnable. It is situated on a fan, having a deep nullah bisecting it from far away inside the hills to the Yarkhun river, the walls of the nullah being perfectly precipitous

and from 200 to 300 feet deep. The main road runs along the whole length of the fan, winding down to the bottom of the nullah near the river and up the other side into the corresponding half of the fan. The second path is a mere goat track, which goes almost straight down and up the other side; this was destroyed on our side of the nullah. The enemy had erected sangars at the head of these roads, which entirely commanded the approaches, and would have swept us away if we had used them.

The sangars were sunk into the ground, and head-cover was provided by a covering of timber and stones.

On the left of their position they had sangars on the spur of the hill in a general line with the sangars on the plain, and on the hill above parties of men were stationed to throw down stones. Sangar No. 16 was fortunately unoccupied. On the right of their position, across the river and slightly in advance of the general line, they had another line of sangars on a spur stretching away high up into the snow line.

25. *Orders for attack*.—My orders for the attack were therefore as follows:—

The advance guard, on gaining the maidan, was to make its way well up to the right and high up the fan, where the formation of the ground favoured an advance under cover to within 500 yards of the nullah. It was directed to direct its attack on Sangar No. 17 with well-directed volleys, till the guns and remainder of the force came into position. Sangar No. 17 was first to be demolished, and attention then to be directed on the main Sangars, 12—15, while the levies made their way high up the nullah in search of a path for a possible point to cross and turn the left of the enemy's position, and on the enemy being seen to retire, a general advance to be made.

26. *Advance from Mastuj 13th April*.—I advanced from Mastuj at 7 A.M. on 2 guns of No. 1, Kashmir Mountain Battery, the 32nd Pioneers, 40 of the Kashmir Sappers, 100 of the 4th Kashmir Infantry, 100 Levies, the 13th April, with the force as per margin, the baggage being left behind till orders were received for its advance under the escort of a portion of the garrison. There was some time lost and difficulty experienced in crossing the Yarkhun river. The advance guard coming in contact with the enemy at 10.30 A.M., advanced too much towards the centre of the plain and the attack was carried out as follows:—

27. *Action of Nisa Gol, 13th April, 1895*.—The advance guard, "A" Company, deployed into line and advanced in extended order when within 900 yards of the position, forming its own supports and became the extreme left of the firing line. "C" Company following soon after, prolonged the line to the right, also

forming its own supports. "E" and "G" Companies in reserve, in column of half-companies, forming single rank and opening out to one pace as they advanced.

Reinforcements being called for, "E" Company advanced and prolonged the line to the right. "G" Company being called up similarly, later on formed the extreme right of the firing line. The levies well on the right rather higher up the nullah.

While these movements were being executed, the battery came into action opposite No. 17 Sangar, at a range of 500 yards, with common shell, which knocked down the wall of the sangar to a height of about three feet, and fire from it was for a short time silenced. The guns then advanced against the large Sangar No. 16, which was not visible till within 150 yards, and was luckily unoccupied. The defenders of No. 17 Sangar having resumed their fire, I directed the guns to fire at it again; after two common shell and two case had been fired into it at a range of 275 yards, its fire ceased and the guns were retired. The fire from this sangar was desultory for the remainder of the action; the levies now proceeded up the nullah to carry out their turning movements, and were left to their own devices in carrying them out.

The Infantry having deployed, "A" and "C" Companies kept the enemy engaged directly in front along the main line of sangars, the latter Company occasionally directing its fire half right against the sangars on the hills of that flank. "E" and "G" Companies' fire was almost entirely directed against the hill sangars, occasional volleys being directed on small parties of the enemy occupying hill-tops 800 or 900 yards distant.

The general average distance at which fire was opened to the front was opened and kept up at 250 yards to 300 yards.

The artillery moving to another position opened fire on sangars in the centre of the enemy's position at a range of 875 yards, and afterwards on Sangar No. 11 on the right centre of the enemy's position, at ranges from 1,050 to 1,200 yards.

28. *Method of crossing the nullah.*—After Sangar No. 17 had been somewhat silenced, Lieutenant Beynon, my Staff Officer, informed me that a goat-path had been observed on the other side of the nullah and a practicable spot to attempt a crossing, and asked me for leave to take the Kashmir Sappers to make a practicable path down into the nullah, and the Company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry to cross it, when made, under cover of the fire of the deployed infantry. The scaling ladders were brought up and lowered, and after half-an-hour's work a track was made to the bottom of the nullah and an ascent by the goat track

on the further side assured. A party of ten Kashmir Sappers, with Lieutenant Beynon, Lieutenant Moberly, commanding the Company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry, and Lieutenant Oldham, Royal Engineers, commanding the Kashmir Sappers, descended, and were being followed by the 4th Kashmir Infantry, when some guncotton lying open on the ground at the commencement of the track was ignited by a bullet striking it. A temporary retirement of the line of those near the explosive to cover some 30 yards in rear was ordered, but speedily brought to the front again when no danger of an explosion was to be apprehended. Eventually a party of about fifteen reached the other bank, and almost simultaneously with the turning movement of the levies, who had reached No. 17 Sangar and its vicinity, having run the gauntlet of a stone shot in their course.

29. *Flight of the enemy.*—The appearance of these bodies on the enemy's left caused a general flight, and they streamed out of their sangars in a long line, with the guns firing at ranges from 950 to 1,425 yards and under volleys from the infantry. The ground falling away near their line of retreat did not favour our fire, and protected them till almost out of range.

30. *Advance of main body across nullah.*—A general advance was then made across the nullah by paths "C" and "D," and as soon as a Company could be mustered it was sent in pursuit; but their flight was extremely rapid and came no longer under our fire; the enemy in the sangars on the left bank of the river disappeared into the snow, while those on the right bank who escaped our fire fled towards Drasan.

31. *General details of action.*—We bivouacked that night opposite Sanoghar, close to the scene of action. I attach a list of our casualties.

Confronted as they were by an enemy they could not see, I cannot speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during the course of the action, which lasted two hours, and during which they were subjected to a very heavy and trying fire from the front and left flank.

Some 40 of Umra Khan's Jandolis were reported to be in the enemy's sangars; the fire was entirely from Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, the wounds being principally from the former.

The fire discipline on our side was excellent, and contributed materially in keeping down the fire from the sangars.

32. *Enemy's casualties.*—I estimate the number of the Chitralis opposed to us to have been some 1,500 or more, and their casualties from native reports to have been some 60 killed and 100 wounded.

33. *Wounded*.—Our wounded were returned to Mastuj under the escort of the garrison (who brought out the baggage) the next morning, under the personal superintendence of Surgeon-Captain Luard, Indian Medical Service, charpoyas having been obtained for them from Sanoghar.

34.—*Kila Drasan, 14th April*.—On the 14th April I marched to Kila Drasan, with the object of seeing to what extent the enemy might be on my right flank, as Mahommed Isa had fled in that direction; the road being broken, a long detour had to be made up a spur some 2,000 feet high above the road, which brought us on to a pami-like elevation, and led over grassy downs straight above Kila Drasan, which was found to be empty; the bridge here was destroyed, but repaired from material obtained from the fort by the levies and 32nd Pioneers. The rear guard did not get in till after dark, and many of the coolies deserted. There were large supplies of grain, &c., in the fort, but as the villages were entirely deserted, no coolies could be found to carry it away.

35. *Khusht, 15th April*.—On the 15th the column marched to Khusht, rain falling steadily all day.

36. *Lun, 16th April*.—On the 16th I marched to Lun, the rain ceasing about midday; this was a very bad and trying march.

37. *Barnas, 17th April*.—On the 17th a march was made to Barnas; the bridge over the river at Pret having been broken, the troops forded the river breast-high, about a mile above Barnas; this was carried out under great difficulties, and I received great assistance from the levies, who stood below the crossing in the stream and saved many men from being washed away, and recovered kits floating down the stream.

38. *Maroi, 18th April*.—On the 18th we proceeded only as far as Maroi, which the enemy were reported to be holding, but was found evacuated on arrival. Mahommed Isa and his following, keeping a march ahead of us, had only left the place that morning.

39. *Khogazi, 19th April*.—On the 19th I arrived at Khogazi. Having heard that the Guland Gol was being held, preparations were made to bridge the river in order to crown the heights on the right bank. The levies being sent ahead to reconnoitre found the Guland Gol unoccupied; having mended the bridge over the torrent bearing that name, they advanced into Khogazi. The bridging operations over the river were therefore discontinued, and the column marched direct to that village. In the afternoon a letter was received from Surgeon-Major Robertson, C.S.I., informing us that Sher Afzal had fled southwards and the investment of Chitral had been raised.

40. *Chitral, 20th April to 23rd April*.—On the 20th the column marched at 6 A.M., and arrived in Chitral by 2 P.M.

The garrison had been invested for 47 days, and some of the enemy's sangars were within twenty yards of the fort walls.

The column encamped for three days south of the fort, and on the 23rd April the whole force including the garrison moved into a new camp on more open ground, on a spur commanding the valley, leaving a guard of fifty men in the fort for the protection of the new Mehtar.

On the following days steps were taken to entrench the position, and communications were opened up with the Chitral Relief Force at Dir.

I am thankful to say that my task was carried out with so little loss of life.

* * * * *

On the 14th March orders were issued for the mobilization of the First Army Corps, and on the 31st the troops composing the Chitral Relief Force assembled at Nowsheera, under the command of Lieut.-General Sir Robert Low, K.C.B., commanding Lucknow District. His force consisted of three Brigades, the composition of which is given below:—

1st Infantry Brigade—Commanded by BRIGADIER-GENERAL A. A. A. KINLOCH, C.B.

1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps.

1st Battalion Bedfordshire Regiment.

15th Sikh Bengal Infantry.

37th Dogra Bengal Infantry.

No. 1 British Field Hospital.

No. 14 Native Field Hospital.

2nd Infantry Brigade—Commanded by BRIGADIER-GENERAL H. G. WATERFIELD.

1st Battalion Gordon Highlanders.

2nd Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers.

4th Sikh Infantry.

Guides' Infantry.

No. 2 British Field Hospital.

No. 35 Native Field Hospital.

3rd Infantry Brigade—Commanded by BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. F. GATACRE, D.S.O.

2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders.

1st Battalion East Kent Regiment ("The Buffs").

25th Punjab Infantry.

2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles.

No. 8 British Field Hospital.

No. 19 Native Field Hospital.

Divisional Troops.

Guides' Cavalry.

11th Bengal Lancers.

13th Bengal Infantry.

23rd Pioneers.

No. 15 Field Battery, Royal Artillery.

Nos. 3 and 8 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery.

No. 4 Hazara Mountain Battery.

Nos. 1, 4, and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

Engineer Field Park from Roorkee.

No. 4 British Field Hospital A and B Sections.

Nos. 17 and 18 Native Field Hospitals.

Veterinary Field Hospital No. 1, from Rawul Pindi.

No. 1 Maxim Gun and detachment of eight Men, 1st Battalion Devonshire Regiment, under command of Captain A. L. Peebles.

Lines of Communication Troops—Commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL E. STEDMAN, C.B.

1st Battalion East Lancashire Regiment.

29th Punjab Infantry.

30th Punjab Infantry.

No. 2 Derajat Mountain Battery. Four Guns.

No. 4 British Field Hospital, C and D Sections.

No. 24 Native Field Hospital.

Nos. 5 and 6 British Field Hospitals and Nos. 28 and 29 Native Field Hospitals for sick and wounded returning from the front.

Departmental Units.

No. 2 Veterinary Field Hospital from Rawul Pindi.

Field Medical Store Depot from Mian Mir.

British General Hospital, Peshawar.

Native General Hospital, Peshawar.

$\frac{1}{4}$ General Veterinary Hospital, Umballa.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Base Veterinary Store Depot, Umballa.

Ordnance Field Park, Rawul Pindi.

Reserve Brigade—Commanded by MAJOR-GENERAL CHANNER, V.C. C.B.

1st Battalion Rifle Brigade.

26th Punjab Infantry.

2nd Battalion 4th Gurkha Rifles.

2nd Battalion 3rd Gurkha Rifles.

The three Brigades moved northwards from Nowshera on the morning of April 1st, left Hoti Mardan on the 2nd, and arrived in the vicinity of Dergai the same evening. At 7 o'clock of the next morning, the second Brigade moved off to attack the Malakand Pass, on which the enemy were reported to have taken up a strongly fortified position. The first Brigade was in support with orders to push on through the second Brigade, when the latter gained the summit of the Pass; and the third Brigade was held in reserve. The obstinate resistance to the advance of the British troops, and the success attending their efforts is now a matter of history. The official description of the advance is interesting as particularizing the work done by each regiment in the operations, and the nature of the work that was done.

Dated Camp Khar, Swat Valley, the 5th April, 1895.

From—The General Officer Commanding the Chitral Field Force.

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honour to make the following report on the action of 3rd April, when the Malakand Pass was captured by the troops under my command.

2. As previously explained by telegram, I learnt on the 1st April that all three passes into Swat, *viz.*, the Malakand, the Shakkot, and the Morah passes, were held by the enemy, and that the majority of them occupied the Shakkot and Morah passes.

At that time, the disposition of the troops of this force was so arranged as to attack the Malakand and the Shahkot passes simultaneously on the morning of the 3rd of April. The 1st Brigade was then at Lundkhwar on the road to the Shahkot Pass. The 2nd and 3rd Brigades were at Jalala on the road to the Malakand Pass.

3. Consequent on the above information, I determined to deceive the enemy as to my intention by advancing cavalry to Pali on the Shahkot road on the 2nd April. The idea that that pass would certainly be attacked was maintained, but I directed the 1st Brigade to join me at Darghai opposite the Malakand Pass on the morning of the 2nd April, and hoped by a forced march on the night of the 1st April to reach Darghai by 8 a.m., and carry the pass on the 2nd April with the three Brigades.

4. A storm of wind and rain, however, raged all through the night of the 1st, and at midnight I was obliged to abandon my intention of a night march, it being an impossibility for the men to load up the transport in such darkness, rain and mud. All that could be done therefore was to start at day-break, and collect the three Brigades at Darghai on the 2nd, and make the attack on the 3rd April.

5. I may note here that, so far as deceiving the enemy as to my intention of attacking only one pass, the plan was completely successful, though the attack took place a day later than I had hoped for. The enemy had not sufficient time to get across the hills and help their comrades on the Malakand Pass between the evening of the 2nd April, when they must have fathomed the plan, to the morning of the 3rd, when the attack took place.

6. The attack took place on the morning of the 3rd with the 2nd and 1st Brigades. It was my intention to use the 2nd Brigade only, the 1st being in rear with its mule transport ready to cross the pass as soon as captured, and march on the Swat River; but, as will be seen, I found the pass so strongly held, and so obstinately defended, that to gain the victory I had to utilise both brigades, and at the final moment I had only one regiment in reserve, the other three regiments of the 1st Brigade as well as all four regiments of the 2nd Brigade being engaged in the attack.

7. Starting from Darghai, the pass at first goes through a gradually narrowing valley to the north for about two miles, then bends to the north-east for a mile and a half, where the high hills on the west drop precipitately into the pass. On reaching the bend of the pass to the north-east, it was apparent that the pass was strongly held on the west side, the whole range being lined by men with flags and banners.

8. At this point the 4th Sikhs were sent to occupy a spur which jutted out from the range to the west, and they had to remain there, covering the advance, for the day.

9. The Guides Infantry were directed to ascend the highest point of the western hill, and after gaining the summit, to turn along the crest, and enfilade the position of the enemy, which evidently extended from the highest point to the end of the range, and where, as already noted, the hill precipitately descends into the pass. The Guides Infantry had a most arduous task to perform; they had to ascend the highest peak of the range about 1,500 feet high, and attack and capture several sangas full of the enemy, which were held by riflemen and crowds throwing rocks and stones down, and their advance was necessarily gradual.

10. Meanwhile, as the force advanced, the position of the enemy was disclosed. They occupied the whole of the crest of the western hill with numerous sangas down the sides of the hill, each commanding the one below it, and their main strength was on the northern end of the hill, where it precipitately descended into the valley. The hills on the eastern side of the pass were not held by the enemy till after the point where the western hill dropped into the valley. Full advantage was taken of this fact.

11. There were three mountain batteries with the troops in action, namely, Nos. 3 and 8 Mountain Batteries, Royal Artillery, and No. 4 (Derajat) Mountain Battery of four guns—in all 16 guns; and these took up position after position on the eastern slope of the valley, and most successfully prevented any concentration of the enemy when the infantry advance was ordered.

12. It soon became apparent that if the assault was delayed till the position was turned by the Guides that the action would be unduly delayed, and the Guides themselves seriously outnumbered.

13. At this time I also ascertained that, although the pass appeared to lie in the valley itself and to round the corner of the western hill where it dropped into the valley, yet that beyond this point there was no path nor roadway whatever, the valley being blocked with huge rocks and boulders, and that the crossing of the pass lay to the left over the heights to our left, and which was so strongly held by the enemy. Action was at once therefore taken to carry the hill to the left, which from this point was about 1,000 feet high.

14. The Gordon Highlanders were directed up the crest of the western hill round the point where it touched the valley. The King's Own Scottish Borderers were directed up the centre spur. The 60th Rifles were directed up the slopes from further back in the line, whilst the Bedfordshire Regiment and 37th Dogras pushed

on, rounded the point from which the Gordon Highlanders commenced the ascent, and, turning to the left, ascended the hill from the northern side, the 15th Sikhs being held in reserve.

15. As the infantry ascended it was seen how well the defence of the hill had been organized. The Gordon Highlanders and King's Own Scottish Borderers, ascending as they did on a direct attack, met the greatest resistance and suffered most. Sanga after sanga was obstinately held, each sanga as it was rushed coming at once under the fire of the one above it; and here I may note the admirable service done by the artillery and Maxim guns; several attempts were made by the enemy to concentrate from above and hold lower sangas and positions, but all such attempts were frustrated by the admirable practice of the mountain batteries and Maxim guns over the heads of our advancing infantry, although at several points the sangas were only carried by hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy were gradually driven from position to position, and eventually fled down the other slopes of the western hill as the heads of the attacking columns reached the top, when the pass was captured and fighting over, though they were pursued down the other side as soon as the men got together.

16. The action was begun at 8.30 a.m. and concluded at 2 p.m.

17. The total numbers of the enemy are variously reported, but the actual numbers on the pass were probably about 10,000 to 12,000 men—some 3,000 armed, and the rest using rocks and stones.

18. The enemy's loss was said by themselves to be about 500, and the road down the other side was covered with signs of numbers of wounded men having been carried away. Our loss was 11 men killed, and 8 officers and 39 men wounded.

19. The 1st Brigade remained at the top of the pass, holding it, while the mules of the brigade passed up; but the path was so bad that only a few mules reached the top that night.

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No. 296-A, dated Camp Dir, the 1st May, 1895.

From—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to make the following report on the operations of the troops under my command since crossing the frontier on the 2nd April.

* * * * *

3. In my despatch dated the 5th April I gave a brief account of the assault and capture of the Malakand Pass. It must be remembered that this was written only two days after the action, and, being based on my own observation, was necessarily incomplete. Thus I have to make an important correction in this report regarding one battalion, namely, the 4th Sikh Infantry, who did not remain stationary guarding the left flank of the advance, as I wrote, but joined throughout in the advance up to the highest peaks of the enemy's position, parallel with the Guides Infantry, having an equally arduous climb with them, and meeting with and carrying many sangars full of the enemy. During this advance officers and men alike distinguished themselves. In my original report also the enemy at the Malakand Pass were estimated at 12,000 men, of whom 3,000 were said to be armed with fire-arms, but we afterwards ascertained that the number armed with fire-arms was much larger.

No. 544, dated Camp Khar, the 7th April, 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force.

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to forward a report on the action of the 4th April, 1895, fought by the 1st Brigade of the force under my command.

2. At 1 p.m. the 1st Brigade began to descend from Malakand Kotal along the road to Khar. The advanced guard was furnished by the Bedfordshire Regiment, the main body consisting of the 37th Dogras, No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, the King's Royal Rifles, and one company of the 15th Sikhs; the remainder of the 15th Sikhs being on rear guard and at the Malakand Pass till relieved.

3. When the advanced guard had moved forward about 2 miles down the valley, No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners, were caught up. The enemy were seen in large numbers on a low ridge to the right front and ascending in greater strength a high rocky ridge which ran roughly parallel to the road and at an average of 1,200 yards from it. The Bedfordshire Regiment seized the mouth of the defile, through which the road there ran, with two companies on each flank; another company of the Bedfords and one of King's Royal Rifles ascended a spur immediately on the right of road. The guns came into action here against the parties on the high ridge. The 37th Dogras advanced across the plain and attacked the low ridge to the right front, driving the enemy over it and advancing beyond. The ridge being gained, the Dogras were supported by a company of the 15th Sikhs; the guns advanced to a fresh position and came into action, where also were the King's Royal Rifles with a Maxim, and the Bedfordshire Regiment. After a

time the force crossed the valley and was deployed with the battery and Maxim gun between the King's Royal Rifles and the Bedfords, covering the road the baggage had to take on issuing from the defile.

4. The enemy began to threaten the left flank of the Dogras. Two troops of the Guides coming up round the left of the Dogras charged about 1,200 of them, and killing about thirty, the remainder fled to the hills. No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners, now moved up to the ridge. The enemy now drew off, and the baggage having come up emerged into the plain. The Dogras and Sikhs withdrew, and the whole force moved on into camp near Khar.

5. The enemy's casualties are estimated at five hundred, and ours consisted of:—Europeans—killed none, wounded three; natives—killed two, wounded fifteen.

No. 120-A, dated Camp Sado, 13th April, 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force.

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to forward for information a condensed report, accompanied by a sketch by Lieutenant Gardyne, Gordon Highlanders, of the action at the crossing of the Swat River on the 7th April, 1895.

The 2nd Brigade, less the Gordon Highlanders and the Guides Infantry, encamped at Aladand on the evening of the 6th, and no enemy were seen that day on the further bank of the Swat River till the evening.

On the morning of the 7th a company of the King's Own Scottish Borderers was sent down towards the place where it was proposed to construct the bridge, and were fired at from the ridge of hills on the opposite bank; this ridge was thickly occupied by the enemy, as were the villages of Chaklarrah, Saidabad and Ramorah. The forces at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the 2nd Brigade to-day consisted of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the 4th Sikhs, No. 4 Company, Sappers and Miners, No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, two squadrons of the Guides, to which were added from Khar the 11th Bengal Lancers and the 15th Sikhs, and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery. The 4th Sikhs and No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, fired at the enemy on the hills; the King's Own Scottish Borderers (four companies) and No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery attacked Ramorah fort. Under cover of the fire of the 4th Sikhs and No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, the whole of the cavalry and the 15th Sikhs crossed by a ford about 800 yards from the hills. Directly the cavalry crossed the main ford, the river here consisting of five branches, the enemy began to stream up the plain

towards Uch, thus getting a long start of the cavalry, who pursued them as far as the Katgola pass, nine miles, cutting up about 100 of them, the majority falling to the 11th Bengal Lancers. Two companies of infantry advanced to Uch, five miles, in support of the cavalry, the 15th Sikhs occupied Chakdarrah, the 4th Sikhs Saidabad, and three companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and a section of sappers, crossing by a breast-high ford, Ramorah fort, which proved too strongly built to be destroyed by the explosives at hand. In the evening the two companies returned from Uch, the cavalry, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, and section of Sappers returned to camp at Aladand, the 15th Sikhs and the 4th Sikhs remaining in their position across the river.

The enemy's loss by rifle and shell fire could not be estimated. Our casualties consisted of one man killed, two men drowned crossing the ford, and ten men wounded, and three horses killed and eight wounded.

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No. 150-A, dated Camp Ghobani, the 18th April, 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force.

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a condensed report of the action near Sado on the 13th and 14th April, 1895.

1. On the previous evening the Guides Infantry Battalion had been sent across the Panjkora river on a slight raft bridge, with orders to construct a defensive post on the right bank and protect themselves for the night, and to burn the next morning certain villages on the right bank a mile or two lower down from which firing at our troops and transport had taken place. It was intended to support this battalion early the following day with other troops, but during the night the raft piers were so damaged by logs carried down by the current, that the bridge became useless, and had to be broken up. The Guides Infantry had started up the hill at daylight, and could not be stopped in time.

2. Shortly before noon on the 13th instant, a report was sent in by the Officer Commanding the Guides Infantry that two large columns of the enemy were coming down the Ushiri valley towards him. I at once ordered out the remainder of the 2nd Brigade, with No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery,

No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery, and the four Maxim guns with the brigade. The Guides Infantry were seen to be occupying a very high ridge on the southern side of the Ushiri valley, and distant about 2,000 yards from the left bank of the Panjkora river. From this point they were retiring very slowly in a north-westerly direction, coming down a spur towards the junction of the two rivers. The batteries opened fire as soon as the enemy advancing from the west shewed over the ridge.

3. The Guides Infantry continued to retire slowly down the spurs, and as soon as the enemy had come sufficiently far down the eastern slopes of the hill, our infantry opened fire at ranges from 800 to 1,200 yards from the left bank to cover the retirement. Orders were signalled to the Officer commanding the Guides Infantry to move across the open valley and the Ushiri stream to his post of the previous night, which, being only 100 yards from the left bank, could be well protected by our fire. This he proceeded to do, but was a good deal harassed during the movement by the appearance of the second column of the enemy; which now showed on the north side of the Ushiri valley, and moving parallel to the Guides attempted to get round to some spurs commanding the post, to the east of the village of Khazana. I regret very deeply to report that Lieutenant-Colonel Battye, Commanding the Guides Infantry, was killed by a gunshot wound during this movement. The retirement of the Guides was most steadily carried out, and moving the guns and infantry gradually round the bend of the river on high ground commanding the far bank I was able to keep the enemy at a distance.

4. It was nearly dark by the time the Guides Infantry reached their post. No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery and some infantry were left on the left bank, and ammunition and supplies as well as two Maxim guns under Captain Peebles, Devonshire Regiment, and one company of the 4th Sikhs were sent over on mussock rafts to reinforce the Guides. Firing, however, continued till nearly 11 p.m., and commenced again at daylight the next morning (14th), when Captain Peebles was mortally wounded, and I regret to say, died on the following morning (15th.)

5. The Enemy withdrew entirely up the valley soon after daybreak on the 14th. I estimate their strength at about 2,000 men in each of the two columns, and their casualties were no doubt numerous, but being unable to pursue, I am without definite information on this point.

6. The Enemy are reported to have been a mixed gathering of Salarzais, Mamunds, subjects of the Amir from Asmar and Kenar (of these we know eighteen were killed), and Utman Khels of Amrang, who were far the boldest in coming on.

* * * * *

17. The three days following the above action, while full of anxiety regarding the rising of the Panjkora River in front and the Swat River in rear, were

notable for the arrival in camp of Lieutenants Edwardes and Fowler, who had been prisoners in Umra Khan's hands; their safe arrival in camp being a great relief, as I had constant fears as to what their fate would be on my advancing into Umra Khan's territory.

18. I may record here an instance of the promptitude of Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O., and the gallantry of Major Aylmer, V.C., Royal Engineers, which occurred on the 15th April. On that day I had only three rafts left, and in the last attempt to cross the Panjkora River one of these three rafts was overturned, having on it at the time two British soldiers, Private Hall and Private Ellwood of the Maxim gun detachment of the Devonshire Regiment, one sepoy and one boatman. When the raft was overturned Brigadier-General Gatacre was standing on the bank, and seeing that one of the British soldiers (Private Hall) and the sepoy and boatman had regained the raft, which was being carried down the stream bottom upwards, and knowing that the stream took a considerable bend before it came to the point where the suspension bridge was being built, he galloped down to that point and informed Major Aylmer, who was superintending the construction of the bridge, of the accident. At that time there was no superstructure to the bridge—merely the standards and wire suspension ropes. Major Aylmer ordered a rope to be passed across to the right bank, but the slack was caught by the current, and the rope was carried away. At this moment the raft appeared in sight about 200 yards off, and Major Aylmer seeing the urgency of the case, got into a sling cradle and was pulled to the centre of the stream. The raft immediately after passed under him, and he grasped Private Hall who left his hold on the raft, whereupon his extra weight immersed the cradle in the water, so that officer and man were in great danger of being swept away. However, Major Aylmer held on manfully, and with the assistance of No. 3189, Lance-Naick Sham Singh of No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, who got down into the cradle to help Major Aylmer, the whole party were landed, though with much difficulty and danger.

19. The last action in which the force has been engaged was that of the 17th of April.

No. 160-A, dated Camp Mundia Khan, the 19th April, 1895.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL SIR R. C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India

I have the honor to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, a condensed report, accompanied by a sketch by Lieutenant Robertson, Field Intelligence Officer, of the action near Mamugai on the 17th April, 1895.

1. The force at Sado commenced crossing the suspension bridge near Zulm Baba at day-break. By 10.45 a.m. the following troops had crossed.

- One Squadron. Guides Cavalry.
- Three Squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers.
- No. 2 (Derajat) Mountain Battery.
- Half of No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
- Two companies. 23rd Pioneers.
- The four infantry battalions of the 3rd Brigade.

The King's Own Scottish Borderers had crossed the bridge previously, and held the heights to the north-west of the bridge.

2. The cavalry were pushed on up the valley towards Miankalai, reconnoitring, and about 9 a.m. reached a point about one mile to north-west of Mamugai, when a considerable body of the enemy with flags were seen collecting near Miankalai. On the cavalry retiring, the enemy followed them up to a certain extent, but carefully avoided ground where the cavalry might have acted against them.

3. I pushed on to Ghob ni with the 3rd Brigade, arriving there soon after noon. The enemy had then collected on a bluff in two villages west of Mamugai. The battery came into action about 12.30 p.m., and the enemy soon fell back under cover. The Seaforth Highlanders and 4th Gurkhas moved up to the south side of the valley, and then advanced against the enemy in a westerly direction, driving them back from spur to spur, and eventually arrived at the bluff mentioned about 4 p.m., which they occupied for the night.

4. The cavalry had been moved up the valley to their original position, to try and intercept the enemy in their retreat on Miankalai, but the enemy kept so far over to the west side of the Jandol valley that our cavalry were unable to get at them. Our loss was very slight—eight men wounded, and nine horses wounded, of which two had afterwards to be shot.

5. The enemy's loss was probably slight; their total number engaged was from 3,000 to 4,000, composed of a miscellaneous gathering of Mamunds, Salarzaïs, a few Mohmands, and a few inhabitants of Asmar and Kunar. It is believed Umra Khan was not present in person. The enemy appeared to retire mainly on Miankalai.

20. I cannot conclude this portion of my report without bringing to His Excellency's notice the passage of the Lowarai Pass by the troops of the 3rd Brigade, under the direction of Brigadier-General W. F. Gatacre, D.S.O., at the time there was about three miles of ascent to be made over snow, and the same extent of snow on the descent. The pass was crossed in very bad weather, which added to the difficulties and to the time taken in crossing the mules and supplies. The time of year (early spring) necessitated the passage being, if possible, done in the very early morning while it was yet freezing and the snow was as sound as possible. The start, therefore, was made from Gujar at the foot of the snow at 1.30 a.m. by torch-light. A strong working party led the advance armed with improvised snow-ploughs to cut through drifts when necessary, but their main duty was to steadily tramp down a track all the way, which in this manner hardened sufficiently to bear the weight of the mules, while men with torches were left at turns and dangerous places; for if once a mule left the track, it at once sank into the adjoining snow and had to be unladen and lifted again on to the beaten path. In this way the top of the pass was reached in the middle of heavy rain and sleet at 7 a.m. The descent on the north side is very steep, never less than 1:4 and often 1:3, and the track had to be tramped down in zigzags. The laden mules found it almost impossible to control their movements, especially as the rain, freezing on the snow, had made the top layer into a sheet of ice, and large numbers of them were constantly slipping off and, so to speak, "tobogganing" straight down the mountain. General Gatacre in his report says he saw as many as twenty at a time solemnly sliding down on their haunches for distances varying from 100 to 200 feet or more, when they turned complete somersaults into the snow, whence they could not move till dug out; and as it was impossible to load them again there, the bags or boxes carried by them were sent sliding down the mountain, guided by ropes from party to party of men stationed on the descent, while the animals, replaced without loads on the path, found their way down the beaten track.

The column reached Ziarat, on the north side of the pass, below the snow line by nightfall. I may add that the pass became more and more dangerous from this time till the snow melted sufficiently to admit of a summer road being made above the snow-covered torrent by the Pioneers. The only passage, until the snow melted sufficiently to admit of this being done, was up and down the centre of the snow-covered torrent, and for about ten days in the spring this becomes very dangerous, owing to the liability to sink through into the water beneath and from the avalanches of snow from the adjoining cliffs. Probably the best time to cross this and other passes of this nature is on a fine day at the latter end of winter when the snow is hard.

No. 1174-A—" *Field Operations*,"—dated Laram Pass, 27th July, 1895.

From—LIEUTENANT-GENERAL SIR ROBERT C. LOW, K.C.B., Commanding the Chitral Relief Force,

To—The Adjutant-General in India.

I have the honor to submit the following report in continuation of my No. 296-A of the 1st May last:—

1. After the capture of Sher Afzal the troops were halted, and it was a question as to whether it was desirable to move up to the Chitral Fort. The British Agent there advised that the troops should not advance, on the ground that the valley, already devastated by Umra Khan, could not give supplies.

2. The Government of India, however, decided that British troops should be shown at Chitral.

Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O., commanding the 3rd Brigade, was ordered to move on the three marches from Ashreth to Chitral.

He found the track up the Kunar River quite as bad as, if not worse than, the defiles on each side of the Lowari Pass, and, as before, the track had to be made passable by the skill of engineer officers and sappers and by the willing labor of the troops.

3. During the first week of May I was detained at Dir. The Khan of Dir at this time wanted our constant support. He had, by capturing Sher Afzal and handing him over to me, done good service and simplified the political situation at Chitral, but the duty was a very unpleasant one for him, and he incurred a great deal of unpopularity amongst the people of his own country, in which he was not yet firmly established as ruler.

It was only right that I should here record the military services of the Khan of Dir during the advance of the Force, as it bears considerably on the main object of the expedition, namely, the relief of Chitral Fort.

Mahomed Sharif Khan, the Khan of Dir, some years ago was dispossessed of the whole of his territory by Umra Khan, and at the time of the mobilization of the Chitral Relief Force he was a refugee in Upper Swat. On hearing that the Government of India intended to send a force against Umra Khan, he joined me at the front, avowedly with the object of regaining his lost territory and position, but offering his services at the same time,—services which, as will be seen, were afterwards of great importance.

After the action of the 4th April, on the descent from the Malakand Pass to the Swat Valley, the Khan of Dir was sent on in advance across the Laram Pass into Dir territory, with orders to raise his tribes and recapture, if possible, all the forts in Dir territory then held by detachments of Umra Khan's men, and then to push men across the Lowari Pass to the assistance of the besieged garrison of Chitral.

The delay to the advance of the Force caused by the floods in the Panjkora River, the washing away of the first bridge, and the necessity of building a suspension bridge, have been duly reported in my dispatch, of which this is a continuation. At that time it was believed that the garrison of Chitral had food only till the 20th April, and after the defeat of Umra Khan on the 17th, and his flight, it was clear that, using the utmost exertions, the leading troops could hardly reach Chitral before the 25th, and that the action of the Khan of Dir might have an important effect on the fate of the besieged garrison.

The Khan carried out his instructions most loyally, not only in capturing the different forts in Dir territory, in doing which, in doing which, he acted as much for himself as for us, but also in pushing forward men into the Chitral Valley, which is outside his territory, and which was done entirely in our interests.

He captured the Fort of Dir from Umra Khan's troops on the 12th April, with the loss of sixty of his own men, and he pushed forward men under his brother, who took and occupied the fort of Kila Drosch, the most important fort in the Chitral Valley, on the 18th April. Kila Drosch is two marches south of Chitral Fort; and on the same date Colonel Kelly's troops were two marches north of Chitral Fort, while Brigadier-General Gatacre's brigade had reached Barwa, five marches south of Kila Drosch. The siege of Chitral was raised that night, the garrison finding themselves free on the morning of the 19th April.

It is due to the Khan of Dir that the active part he took should be recognized, since, if he did nothing more, he heralded our arrival in the Chitral Valley.

5. Leaving Dir on the 9th of May, I marched to Chitral, and reached it on the 16th. The troops were drawn up to receive me, and in front of them I met the British Agent, Surgeon-Major G. S. Robertson, C.S.I., and the provisional Mehtar, the boy Shuja-ul-Mulk.

The parade was made as impressive as possible, for the Chitralis had never seen British soldiers, and as a matter of fact did not believe that we had any. A portion of the garrison that had defended the fort during the siege, viz., one company of the 14th Sikhs, was in the centre, supported on the right by the Gilgit Field Force, consisting of the 32nd Pioneers and two guns of the

Kashmir Mountain Battery, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel J. G. Kelly, 32nd Pioneers; on the left were the troops of the 3rd Brigade, *viz.*, the 1st Battalion of "The Buffs." No. 2. (Derajat) Mountain Battery, No. 4 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners, a detachment of the 2nd Battalion 4th Ghurka Rifles, and my escort of one company of the Seaforth Highlanders: the whole parade being under the command of Brigadier-General Gatacre, D.S.O. After inspecting the troops, I formed them into three sides of a square and, addressing them, pointed out that the parade was a very remarkable one, in that every man present had received the congratulations of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress; that the gallantry of the besieged garrison of Chitral was the pride and admiration of all their comrades in the army; as was also the determined march of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his troops who were the first to reach Chitral.

* * * * *

Sir Robert Low addressed the troops in the following words:—" This is a remarkable parade, on which are assembled Colonel Kelly's troops and those of the 3rd Brigade of the force sent by the Government of India to relieve Chitral. All here have already received the congratulations of the Queen-Empress, and I need not enlarge on the achievements of the troops or their consequences. The devoted gallantry and heroic courage of the garrison are the pride and admiration of their comrades, and will pass into history and form one of the highest achievements of the British-Indian and Kashmir armies. The example of Colonel Kelly shows what can be done by the determination and courage of British officers. It would have been better if Umra Khan had waited here to be attacked by Colonel Kelly's troops from the north and the Chitral Relief Force from the south, but he only awaited defeat in the Jhandoul Valley by General Gatacre, and I do not think that General Gatacre, with all his inexhaustible energy, could have reached Chitral before the 25th, whilst Colonel Kelly arrived on the 20th, and the honour of being the first to arrive in Chitral will always remain with Colonel Kelly and the troops he led so well. It is not the time to speak of the troops under my command, but I take the opportunity to thank the troops for their extremely hard and willing work on the communications. From the beginning they have been employed in making roads for the troops behind them. I thank them for the magnificent work they did, and I do not believe that any other troops in the world could have done as they did on service with field service equipment."

Returning to the dispatch we read:—

6. Prior to my departure from Chitral, the British Agent heard rumours of disturbances in Kohistan, and asked that the troops of this Force should hold the valley and relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's troops. This was sanctioned by Government, and Chitral was occupied by the 2nd Battalion 4th Ghurka Rifles, and the whole line from Chitral to our frontier in India has since been held by the troops of this Force.

7. During the operations of the month of April the troops of the Force under my command advanced from our Indian frontier into Chitral territory, crossing five mountain passes, three of which—the Malakand (2,900 ft.), the Janbatai (7,400 ft.), and the Lowari (10,200 ft.)—were of the most difficult character; and having also to throw bridges over two large rivers, the Swat and the Panjkora, besides innumerable smaller streams. The tracks across the mountains were so narrow and difficult that it is no exaggeration to say that the troops had to make them passable for baggage animals every yard of the way.

8. During the first advance of the Force the object was speed, and the labour of the troops was spent in making the mountain tracks passable. Since the 1st May the troops have been employed in improving these tracks into roads, over which the transport can work without exhaustion.


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On September 2nd, British Agent at Gilgit, now Sir George Robertson, K.C.S.I., held a Durbar at Chitral, and formerly installed Shuja-ul-Mulk as Mehtar. He is an intelligent and kindly-spirited boy, and shews every disposition to be friendly with the British Government. No change has been made in the administration of the Chitral State itself, but permanent communications have been established, *via* the Malakand and Lowari Passes, from India. It is the scenery along the road which forms the subject of the following photographs. They were taken by Sergeant-Major Develin, R.E., Bombay Sappers and Miners, who accompanied the 3rd Brigade as Photographer.

BOMBAY, *March 12th, 1896.*



MALAKAND PASS.



MALAKAND PASS, FROM SPUR IN VALLEY,
DURING ACTION.



6A.
BUDDIST ROAD, MALAKAND PASS,
LOOKING SOUTH.



SWAT VALLEY,
LOOKING EAST.



12


CROSSING SWAT RIVER,
LOOKING SOUTH.



15A
KHAMRANI PASS,
LOOKING NORTH-EAST.



LARAM PASS,
LOOKING SOUTH.



PANJKORA RIVER,
AFTER BREAK OF BRIDGE.



20A

PANJKORA RIVER,
BELOW SWING RAFT.



21

PANJKORA RIVER,
SCENE OF "THE GUIDES" FIGHT.




18

PANJKORA RIVER,
SUSPENSION BRIDGE, "THE BUFFS" CROSSING.



MAMUGAI AT CLOSE OF ACTION.



A BRASS GUN FOUND IN BARWA.



BARAUL VALLEY, FROM JANBATAI,
FORT JANBATAI IN DISTANCE.




VIEW FROM JANBATAI KOTAL,
LOOKING SOUTH-WEST.



FORT IDO, BARAUL VALLEY.



BANDAI, BARAUL VALLEY,
LOOKING EAST.



THIRD BRIGADE CAMP AT DIR.



35

THE KHAN OF DIR, GENERAL GATACRE,
AND STAFF.



LOWARI PASS,
NORTH OF GUJAR.



GUJAR,
LOOKING NORTH.



VALLEY, SOUTH OF LOWARI PASS,
LOOKING WEST.



43

LOWARI PASS, LOOKING NORTH,
GHURKAS CROSSING.



LOWARI PASS,
DIFFERENT VIEW.



LOWARI PASS, LOOKING SOUTH,
"THE BUFFS" ASCENDING.



LOWARI PASS, NORTH SIDE, LOOKING NORTH,
"THE BUFFS" DESCENDING.



LOWARI PASS,
SOUTH SIDE, "BUFFS" ASCENDING.



LOWARI PASS,
GHURKAS DESCENDING.



+BA

LOWARI PASS,
"BUFFS" DESCENDING.



THE 2/4 GHURKAS AT ZIARAT.




ASHRETH VALLEY,
NORTH OF ZIARAT.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
NORTH OF ZIARAT.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
NORTH OF ZIARAT.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
NORTH OF ZIARAT.




ASHRETH VALLEY, NORTH OF ZIARAT,
SHEWING KAFFRISTAN MOUNTAINS.



VIEW FROM ZIARAT,
LOOKING SOUTH.



VIEW FROM ZIARAT,
LOOKING SOUTH.



64

▲
ZIARAT CAMP,
LOOKING NORTH.



VIEW NORTH OF ZIARAT,
LOOKING SOUTH.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
LOOKING NORTH-WEST.



ZIARAT VALLEY,
LOOKING SOUTH.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
NORTH OF ZIARAT.



VIEW OF KAFFIR ROCK,
SHOWING STAIRCASE TRACK.



ASHRETH VALLEY,
LOOKING SOUTH-EAST.



ASHRETH VALLEY, NORTH OF ZIARAT,
LOOKING SOUTH.



73
ASHRETH VALLEY, NEAR MIRKANDI,
LOOKING SOUTH.



BADUGAL VALLEY, NEAR MIRKANDI,
LOOKING WEST.



CHITRAL RIVER,
TWO MILES NORTH-EAST OF MIRKANDI.



CHITRAL RIVER,
THREE MILES NORTH OF MIRKANDI.



AYLMER'S STAIRCASE, NORTH OF BADUGAL,
LOOKING SOUTH.



KILA DROSH FORTS.



SHISHI KUF VALLEY,
SHEWING CAMPS OF 3RD BRIGADE.



81

KHAIRABAD,
LOOKING NORTH.



82

KHAIRABAD,
CLIFF BRIDGE, BUILT BY 3RD BRIGADE, LOOKING NORTH.



82.

KHAIRABAD,
CLIFF BRIDGE, BUILT BY 3RD BRIGADE, LOOKING NORTH.



KHAIRABAD,
CLIFF BRIDGE, BUILT BY 3RD BRIGADE, LOOKING NORTH.



85

TIROCH MIR,
FROM CHAMARKAND, 5 MILES SOUTH OF CHITRAL.



TIROCH MIR,
FROM CHAMARKAND, 5 MILES SOUTH OF CHITRAL.



TIROCH MIR,
FROM BROZ.



ERRATA.

Instead of MEHTAR AMIR-UL-MULK.


Read MEHTAR NIZAM-UL-MULK.

HILL IN BROZ VALLEY,
WHERE MEHTAR AMIR-UL-MULK WAS ASSASSINATED.



85

VIEW OF CHITRAL VALLEY FROM SPALASH,
LOOKING SOUTH.



VIEW OF CHITRAL VALLEY,
SOUTH-WEST OF DANIN.



CHITRAL FORT,
FROM LEFT BANK, LOOKING SOUTH-WEST.




CHITRAL FORT,
FROM LEFT BANK, LOOKING SOUTH.




CHITRAL FORT,
FROM LEFT BANK, LOOKING SOUTH.




CHENAR TREES,
AT THE NORTH-WEST TOWER OF FORT.




CHITRAL FORT.
NORTH-WEST CORNER.



CHITRAL FORT,
FROM TOP OF SOUTH-EAST TOWER.



CHITRAL FORT,
SHEWING INTERIOR, LOOKING NORTH-WEST.




98


CHITRAL FORT,
GUN TOWER, SHEWING EXPLODED MINE.




CHITRAL FORT,
SHEWING MINE FROM GUN TOWER.




FUNERAL SERVICE OVER CAPT. BAIRD'S GRAVE.



CAPT. BAIRD'S TOMBSTONE.



CHITRAL BRIDGE,
FROM LEFT BANK.



CHITRAL BRIDGE,
FROM RIGHT BANK.



REPRESENTATIVE CHITRALIS

AWAITING SIR ROBERT LOW'S ARRIVAL AT CHITRAL.



REPRESENTATIVE CHITRALIS MEETING SIR ROBERT LOW.



INSPECTION BY GENERAL SIR ROBERT LOW,
AT CHITRAL.



INSPECTION BY GENERAL SIR ROBERT LOW,
AT CHITRAL.



109

INSPECTION BY GENERAL SIR ROBERT LOW,
AT CHITRAL.



SIR GEORGE ROBERTSON, K.C.S.I.

LIEUT. HARLEY,
14TH SIKHS.

LIEUT. GURDON,
ASSISTANT POLITICAL,

CAPT. TOWNSEND,
C.I.H.



THE
PROVISIONAL MEHTAR,
AND MINISTERS.



AMIR-UL-MULK & GUARD,
CHITRAL.



COLONEL KELLY & OFFICERS, 32ND PIONEERS.



DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS' STAFF, C. R. FORCE.



SIR ROBERT LOW'S ESCORT,
SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS.



THIRD BRIGADE STAFF, CHITRAL.




OFFICERS OF THE BUFFS, CHITRAL.



"THE BUFFS" AT CHITRAL.



LOWARI PASS IN SUMMER,
LOOKING NORTH.



GUJAR,
LOOKING SOUTH.



GUJAR,
LOOKING SOUTH.



SHUJA-UL-MULK, MEHTAR OF CHITRAL,
WITNESSING GAME OF POLO.




SHUJA-UL-MULK, MEHTAR OF CHITRAL,
IN THE FORT.



SHUJA-UL-MULK, MEHTAR OF CHITRAL,
WITH ATTENDANTS.



NO. 2 DERAJAT MOUNTAIN BATTERY—"ACTION FRONT."




GRAVES OF THE ROYAL FAMILY,
CHITRAL.



135

TRANSPORT LINES, KILA DROSH,
LOOKING NORTH.



GRAVES OF KHANS, GUJAR VALLEY.



GROUP OF No. 2 DERAJAT MOUNTAIN BATTERY.




GUJAR VALLEY IN SUMMER,
FROM MIRGA.




DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS' CAMP, MIRGA,
FROM OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE VALLEY.



NO. 8 BRITISH FIELD HOSPITAL, MIRGA,
FROM EAST SIDE OF VALLEY.



A VALLEY ON WEST SIDE OF MIRGA CAMP.



A VALLEY ON EAST SIDE OF MIRGA CAMP.



126A


A VALLEY ON NORTH SIDE OF MIRGA CAMP.



A VALLEY ON NORTH-WEST SIDE OF MIRGA CAMP.



LOWARI PASS IN SUMMER,
FROM 1 MILE NORTH OF GUJAR, LOOKING NORTH.



BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS' CAMP,
FROM DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS' CAMP.



158

No. 3 FIELD POST OFFICE, THIRD BRIGADE.



"THE BUFFS" CAMP AT MIRGA,
FROM EAST SIDE OF VALLEY.



ARNAWEI VALLEY,
4 MILES WEST OF ZAKHANAH PASS.



GROUP OF RECONNAISSANCE PARTY,
ARNAWEI VALLEY.



CAMPS OF AMIR OF AFGHANISTAN'S TROOPS,
ARNAWEI VALLEY.



THE BRIDGE OVER THE SWAT RIVER,

BUILT BY CAPT. WILLIAMS, R.E.



PONTOON BRIDGE OVER SWAT RIVER,
SEPTEMBER, 1895.



PONTOON BRIDGE OVER SWAT RIVER,
SEPTEMBER, 1895.



CEMETERY ON THE LARAM PASS.



CEMETERY ON THE LARAM PASS.



SUSPENSION BRIDGE, BETWEEN WARAI AND DARORA,
IN PANJKORA RIVER.



DARORA CAMP, PANJKORA VALLEY.



VIEW OF PANJKORA RIVER,
NEAR DARORA.



163


A VIEW IN PANJKORA VALLEY.



THE KHAN OF DIR,
SEPTEMBER, 1895.



KHAN OF DIR AND HIS MINISTER,
MINISTER. THE KHAN.



BRIDGE OVER PANJKORA AT CHOTIATAN.



SUSPENSION BRIDGE AND BLOCK HOUSE OVER PANJKORA RIVER,

BUILT BY CAPT. SARGENT, R.E.



THE "BUFFS'" ENCAMPMENT, LARAM PASS.

AUGUST, 1895.